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Public and Private Education: Is There a
Constitutional Difference?
Mark Tushnett
Discussions of education frequently deal with the differences
between policy in connection with public education and policy in
connection with private education. Analysts believe that the policies necessarily differ to some extent because the federal Constitution places different constraints on each with respect to the regulation of public and private education.1 For example, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, public schools cannot segregate students
on the basis of race, whereas, again as a matter of constitutional
law, private schools can.2 In this Article, I argue that with respect
to most policy-relevant constitutional questions-that is, questions
that arise in connection with policies that are close to the current
public agenda-the federal Constitution does not impose different
constraints on public and private schools. More precisely, my argument is two-fold: First, if a government identifies a private school's
policy that it believes would benefit public schools, the federal
Constitution allows it to adopt that policy (with minor exceptions).
Second, if a government faces a constitutional constraint on the
policies it may pursue, the federal Constitution allows it to impose
that same constraint on private schools (with even fewer
exceptions).
In making this argument, I rely mostly on rather straightforward readings of the main cases bearing on these questions. Ingenious lawyers could almost certainly devise alternative interpretations, or draw attention to additional cases, that would allow a
judge who wanted to reject my conclusions to do so. My main
point is that, when these straightforward interpretations of the
principal cases are brought together, the most direct conclusion is
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Nicole
Tapay and Katya Lezin for their research assistance, and Peter Byrne for his comments on
a draft of this article.
IIn this Article I am concerned solely with the restraints placed on education policy by
the federal Constitution. State constitutional constraints are surely different with respect to
many of the issues I discuss.
' Compare Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483 (1984), with Norwood v Harrison, 413
US 455, 469 (1973) ("private bias is not barred by the Constitution").
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that the distinction between public and private schools that is part
of the standard conceptual apparatus of constitutional lawyers
turns out to be substantially thinner than many would find comfortable. The exercise, in short, might be thought of as a deconstruction of the public/private distinction that operates on an unsophisticated doctrinal level.'
I.

THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN THE
EXPERIENCE OF EDUCATION: AN ANECDOTAL INTRODUCTION

As a preface to my discussion of the Constitution, I think it
helpful to recount some observations about public and private education that probably motivate that discussion. I have taught at a
large public university in a state whose public culture is militantly
secular, and I now teach at a large private university affiliated with
the Society of Jesus. With a minor exception, probably attributable more to different arrays of power within the universities than
to the public/private distinction," my experience as a teacher, and I
believe the experiences of students as well, has been essentially indistinguishable in both institutions. Similarly, my children have
attended both public and private schools in the District of Columbia, and, again, the quality of their experience, and ours, seems to
have been roughly the same. I do not deny that there are private
schools and universities, particularly elementary schools and small
colleges affiliated with religious denominations, where the quality
of the experience differs substantially from that which I have had, 5
I I will not discuss in detail complex arguments resting on controversial interpretations
of the state action doctrine, the conclusions of which might well be that private schools are
indeed subject to the same substantive limitations, particularly with respect to race, as are
public schools. For my view of the state action doctrine, see Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 NY L Sch L Rev 383 (1988).
" Georgetown University was involved in prolonged litigation over its obligations under
the human rights ordinance of the District of Columbia, as that ordinance was constrained
by the Constitution, to deal with associations of gay and lesbian students. For the litigation
outcome, see Gay Rights Coalition v Georgetown Univ., 536 A2d 1 (DC App 1987). Notably,
the University ultimately accepted a settlement in which it agreed to refrain from discriminating against such associations. Most of the comments on the case, frequently written
before it was settled, assume that, as one commentator put it, the University "could not, in
light of traditional Catholic teaching, regard sexual orientation as a matter of institutional
indifference," and that the application of the ordinance therefore intruded on the religious
institutional autonomy of the University. Gerard Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and State?, 49 La L Rev 1057, 1062 (1989). See also
Comment, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental NondiscriminationPolicies, 41 Stan L Rev 1201 (1989). In light of the University's ultimate position, that assumption cannot be sustained, at least in a strong form.
' I do wonder, however, about the extent to which, were there public elementary
schools and colleges of a size similar to those of these private institutions and which applied
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but the fact that there may be rather small differences in the quality of life across what seems to me a rather broad range of public
and private education leads me to question whether the federal
Constitution actually requires that there be any differences at all.
I offer another view of the question by describing the organic
documents of some major institutions of higher education. The
1650 Charter of Harvard College established a Corporation consisting of seven named members.' The members of the Corporation
were given the power to designate their successors. Although each
of the first members of the Corporation was a minister, the Charter
does not require that their successors maintain any religious affiliation. Harvard, then, is a paradigm of the private secular university.
Georgetown University, in contrast, is a university affiliated with
the Society of Jesus. 7 Its Charter, however, is an 1815 Act of Congress authorizing the University to confer degrees.' Adopted when
James Madison was President, the charter makes no reference to
any church affiliation; indeed, neither do the current By-laws of
the University.9
The certificate of incorporation of the University of Chicago,
in contrast, requires that two-thirds of the trustees of the University, and the University's President, be "members of regular Baptist Churches-that is to say, members of churches of that denomination of Protestant Christians now usually known and recognized
under the name of regular Baptist denomination.' 0 The Charter
of Duke University requires that one-third of the members of its
Board of Trustees be members of the North Carolina Conference
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and another third be
members of the Western North Carolina Conference of that
church. The University's by-laws state that "the aims of Duke University are to assert a faith in the eternal union of knowledge and
secular criteria for selecting students, the experiences in such schools would be different
from the experiences in the schools and colleges to which I refer in the text.
o The Charter is available in a publication of the President and Fellows of Harvard
College, published in 1976.
7 See Office of Undergraduate Admissions, Georgetown University UndergraduateBulletin 1986-87 (Georgetown U, 1986) ("[Georgetown is] . . . an institution that is Catholic").
a 6 Stat 152 (1856).
0 At present the University has a contract with the Society of Jesus that specifies the
University's obligations regarding its religious and educational missions. This contract
might be regarded as one of the University's organic documents as well, in which case the
statement in the text would have to be qualified. Interview with J. Peter Byrne, Washington, DC, Apr 24, 1991.
'0 Quoted in Thomas Goodspeed, A History of the University of Chicago 479 (U of
Chicago Press, 1916).
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religion set forth in the teachings and character of Jesus Christ,
the son of God; . . . to develop a Christian love of freedom and
truth; . . and to render the largest permanent service to the indi-

vidual, the state, the nation, and the church."11
I think that many students at Georgetown would be surprised
to discover that, according to its organic documents, the University
is not a religiously affiliated institution, and that many students at
Chicago and Duke would be equally surprised to discover that, according to organic documents, they attend religiously affiliated institutions. As with my experiences with elementary schools and
universities, my point here is to suggest that the formalities of corporate organization may not capture much of the differences
among schools and universities. The public/private distinction is a
similar formality, and I now turn to an examination of the constitutional constraints on the organization of public and private
education.
II.
A.

ABOLISHING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE SCHOOL DISTINCTION

Existence, Entry, and Exit

The first topic I consider is whether states could obliterate the
differences between public education and private education by
abolishing the former or prohibiting the latter. 1 2 The short answer
is that they almost certainly can abolish public schools, subject to
one minor qualification, and that they cannot prohibit private
schools, with one possible, important exception. 3
1. Abolishing public schools.
Dicta in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v Rodriguez 4 suggest that states might have a constitutional obligation to make education available on terms other than a market-based ability to
History and Government of Duke University 18-19 (Duke U, 1955).
In dealing with the abolition of public education, I also consider the constitutional
constraints on adopting an unregulated voucher system in which parents use vouchers to
pay for the education provided by schools, whether those schools be nominally private or
nominally public. I confess that I am hard-pressed to explain the sense in which any school
in an unregulated voucher system is a public school, other than the fact that its governing
authorities are chosen by a broader electorate than the ones that select the governing authorities of private schools.
Is However, if, as I argue in the next section, governments can impose the same regulations of curricula on private schools that they place on public schools, then it is unclear why
a government would care about going through the formalities of attempting to prohibit the
operation of private schools.
14 411 US 1 (1973).
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pay: "If ... education were made available by the State only to
those able to pay a tuition assessed against each pupil, . . . [the]
case would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for
judicial assistance .
"1... The Court suggested that a constitutional claim might be made "if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities."1 6 In light
of the DeShaney case, 17 however, it seems extremely difficult to
make a cogent argument that there is a right to a public education.
DeShaney holds that the state is under no obligation to provide a
minimal level of police protection.18 Because most theories of government would place police protection higher in the hierarchy of
public functions than public education, and because there seem to
be no obvious differences between the courts' ability to determine
what a minimal level of police protection was and their ability to
determine what a minimally adequate education would be, there
seems to be little to justify treating police protection differently
from education on grounds going to the courts' institutional
competence.
One limit on the state's ability to remit education to the market might arise in connection with desegregation. Suppose that a
state decides to close its public schools in the face of desegregation
orders."9 One case, Palmer v Thompson,20 suggests that a state
might be able to refuse to offer public goods, such as schools, without violating the Constitution. Palmer involved a city's decision,
when desegregation of its public swimming pool was imminent, to
close the pool. The Court held that the closing was constitutionally
permissible-even if it was motivated by a desire to avoid desegregation. Palmer, however, may be limited by the principle of Washington v Davis.2 In addition, Palmer itself distinguished the operation of swimming pools from the operation of public schools on
18 Id at 25 n 60. But note the Court's rather clear suggestion that there is no constitutional basis for a right to an education. Id at 35.
1" Id at 37. These dicta were reaffirmed in Papasanv Allain, 478 US 265, 285-86 (1986),
where the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether there was a constitutional right to a
minimally adequate education.
" DeShaney v Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social. Services, 489 US 189 (1989).
" That is, the holding that there was no "state action" in failing to provide police protection to Joshua DeShaney necessarily implies that the state was under no obligation to
provide such protection. Id.
" Virginia's effort to do so was rebuffed in Griffin v County School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 US 218 (1964), but there the state had not simply remitted education to the
market; it continued to operate public schools in areas not facing desegregation decrees. Id
at 222-23.
80 403 US 217 (1971).

"1 426 US 229 (1976).
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the ground that the latter was "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.1 2 Taking these cases together,
one might conclude that a decision to close the public schools,
premised on a reconsideration of the merits of public education
that itself was occasioned by a desegregation order, might be constitutionally permissible because it is not "intentional" within the
meaning of Washington v Davis. The Supreme Court's pronouncements are unclear enough, however, that under these circumstances the state might not be allowed to make the otherwise permissible decision to leave education to the market if its motive
could be construed as a constitutionally impermissible deprivation
of education.
The desegregation cases also bear on another method of selective withdrawal of public education: the use of a voucher system,
or, to use the current term, a system of unregulated but publicly
4 the Court invalidated
subsidized choice.2 In Norwood v Harrison1
Mississippi's program of providing textbooks to students at both
public and private schools because the state did not consider
whether the private schools were engaging in racial discrimination.2 Similarly, in Gilmore v City of Montgomery" the Court upheld an injunction barring a city from making its parks available
for occasional exclusive use by private schools that discriminated
on the basis of race, and it remanded for further consideration the
lower court's refusal to enjoin nonexclusive use, as in participation
in tournaments with public and other integrated schools.2"
These cases involve "vouchers" in the sense that the state subsidized all schools' activities without respect to the public/private
distinction. They also suggest that the imperatives of desegregation limit a government's ability to ignore the distinction. The
Court saw textbooks as "a basic educational tool" the provision of
which "has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination. 2 8 In Gilmore the availability of parks

403 US at 221 n 6 (quoting Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483, 493 (1954)). In
addition, the Court later characterized Virginia's plan as "an operation of [the] . . .schools

under a thinly disguised 'private' school system actually planned and carried out by the
State and the county to maintain segregated education with public funds." Palmer, 403 US
at 222.

23 See, generally, John Chubb and Terry Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's
Schools (Brookings Inst, 1990).
2' 413 US 455 (1973).
25 Id.

26417 US 556 (1974).
,7 Id.

" Norwood, 413 US at 465, 466.
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for the exclusive use of private schools enabled those schools,
formed with the purpose of allowing parents to avoid sending their
children to desegregated schools, to offer full athletic programs,
thereby making them substantially more attractive educational institutions. 2 9 Even nonexclusive use might, according to the Court,
"directly
impede the progress of court-ordered
school
3
0
desegregation."
The implications of these cases in contexts where no such process is underway are, I think, unclear. Could a state provide tuition
vouchers that parents could use at schools that discriminated in
admission on the basis of race, where the existence of such schools
did not interfere with court-ordered desegregation? As with the
DeShaney case, the issue would, I think, be formulated in terms of
state action: Does the provision of tuition support to such schools
implicate the state enough so that the discriminatory action of the
schools can be imputed to the state? State action doctrine in this
area is notoriously convoluted. Pointing in favor of state action is
Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority,3 1 whose holding can be
understood to be that if a state gets something out of private discrimination to which it lends support, it is implicated in that discrimination.32 Yet, to the extent that a government adopts a
voucher system because it concludes that such a system is sound
public policy, it benefits from the system in a way that is difficult
to distinguish from Burton.
Pointing in the other direction, however, are more recent
cases, such as Rendell-Baker v Kohn,"3 in which the Court suggests
that the state must be implicated in the discriminatory decision
itself before there can be state action. 4 Rendell-Baker involved a
private school that received essentially all of its funds from the
state.3 5 It fired a teacher under circumstances which, had the
school been public, clearly would have violated the Constitution. 6
In finding that there was no state action, the Court said that the
discriminatory decisions "were not compelled or even influenced
by any state regulation."3 " On ordinary understandings of these

Gilmore, 417 US at 569.
80 Id at 571.

31 365 US 715 (1961).
32 Id at 724.
33 457 US 830 (1982).
" Id at 838 n 6.
35 Id at 832.
86 Id at 834-35.
37 Rendell-Baker, 457 US at 841.
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terms, admission decisions by a school that receives tuition vouchers in an unregulated system would appear to be similarly uninfluenced by the state. 88 My tentative conclusion, then, is that a state
could operate an unregulated voucher system unless that system
interfered with court-ordered desegregation; I do not think that
this exception has large public policy implications.
The state action analysis I have just sketched could be recast
to link it to the next question about tuition vouchers. The implication of the state action holding in Rendell-Baker is that there
would be no state action if a state adopts a system of regulating
the distribution of vouchers that is neutral as to race. The other
area of concern in connection with tuition vouchers is, of course,
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Here, too, neutrality is the key to the Court's current position. In Mueller v Allen s9 the Court upheld a statute permitting taxpayers to take deductions for expenses incurred in connection with education. The
system was constitutional, according to the Court, because it made
the benefit available to "all parents, including those whose children attend public schools and those whose children attend nonsectarian private schools . . 4 Such a "neutral" statute "is not
' 41
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
Further, the Court found it irrelevant that by far the largest portion of the benefit would inure to parents who sent their children
to sectarian private schools.' 2
In the higher education context, Witters v Washington Dept.
of Services for the Blind strongly suggests that there is no Establishment Clause objection to a voucher system that permits vouchers to be used at religiously affiliated schools.' 3 Again the Court
It might be suggested that the courts would be willing to find state action where the
action by the nominally private actor involved discrimination based on race rather than, as
in Rendell-Baker, an infringement on principles of free expression. See, for example, Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 US 345, 374 (1974) (Marshall dissenting). Compare
Moose Lodge No. 107 v Irvis, 407 US 163 (1972) (finding no state action in case involving
race discrimination). The present formulations of the state action doctrine do not appear
readily adaptable to such a distinction.
" 463 US 388 (1983).
88

40

Id at 397.

Id at 399.
Id at 400-02.
48 474 US 481 (1986). The most sophisticated legal discussions of voucher systems were
written well before the relevant constitutional doctrine took its contemporary shape. They
understandably devoted substantial attention to arguments that vouchers, or choice systems, might violate the Establishment Clause or might violate Equal Protection norms respecting race in areas not covered by court-ordered desegregation. See, for example, Walter
McCann and Judith Areen, Vouchers and the Citizen-Some Legal Questions, 72 Teachers
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stressed that the system was neutral, and that the state's money
flowed to religious schools solely because of the intervening decision made by the student.
While Witters may perhaps be confined to higher education,
though little in the Court's express analysis indicates why, Mueller
appears to provide strong support for the proposition that a
facially neutral voucher system is constitutionally permissible
without regard to who the ultimate recipients of the funds are.44
To the extent that there are any residual questions about whether
it is permissible to create such a system, they arise from the theory, adopted by the Court in Aguilar v Felton," that some forms
of public support for education-perhaps direct grants of funds to
religious schools-are so visibly endorsements of the religious mission of religiously affiliated schools as to violate the "no endorsement of religion" principle that, for now, defines the Establishment Clause prohibition. The "no endorsement" principle is
malleable enough that I would suppose that some ingenious lawyer
could convince us that an unregulated voucher system sends a signal of government support for religion, but on the face of it I find
the proposition difficult to accept.' 6
One final wrinkle remains. May a state create a voucher sys-7
tem that bars the use of vouchers at church-related schools?'
Such an exclusion appears to violate the fundamental principle of
Coil Rec 389 (1971). The development of constitutional doctrine has made the constitutional
defense of unregulated systems much more straightforward. This is not to say that the policy issues regarding religion, race, and class have been simplified, but is to say only that the
constitutional ones have been.
" Although I do not believe that the cases have yet been juxtaposed to make this point,
one might argue that the Court's willingness to accept statutory accommodations of religion,
but only if they sweep within their scope some substantial amount of nonreligious activity
(see Texas Monthly v Bullock, 489 US 1 (1989)), rests on its perception that the breadth of
the statute blurs the signal of support for religion that would, standing unblurred, violate
the Establishment Clause. Id. If that analysis is correct, then even direct grants to religious
schools, as part of a comprehensive system of supporting parental choice, would be constitutionally permissible.
473 US 402 (1985).
'6 The most plausible argument, I believe, is that in the social context of general misgivings about the merits of public education-in particular because public schools have
failed adequately to inculcate important values-providing general support for religiously
affiliated schools, even through a voucher system, would be seen by the reasonable observer
as an endorsement of the religious values that those schools inculcate and that, by inference,
the public schools do not. It seems to me, however, that this argument specifies to a greater
degree of precision than is warranted what the message of a voucher system really is.
On remand in Witters, the state supreme court concluded that the state constitution
did not permit the use of grants from the state at religiously affiliated schools, and that this
prohibition did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the national constitution. Witters,
112 Wash 2d 363, 771 P2d 1119, cert denied, 110 S Ct 147 (1989).
45
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the religion clauses that a government may not discriminate in
favor of or against religion in its provision of benefits. This principle is sometimes controversial when invoked to bar acts that favor
religion but seems entirely uncontroversial with respect to acts
that disfavor religion. Recently the courts have begun to develop a
principle of "accommodation of religion," according to which governments deal specially with religious institutions, making benefits
available to them that are not available to non-religious institutions, without violating the Establishment Clause. The government's reason is that this sort of permissible accommodation of religion respects the values protected by the Free Exercise Clause
even in situations where failure to accommodate would not itself
violate that clause. 8 Perhaps there might be a parallel sort of accommodation, under which governments could exclude religious institutions from benefits for which they would otherwise be eligible,
in order to respect the values protected by the Establishment
Clause, even when making the benefits available would not violate
that clause.4 9
Widmar v Vincent"0 suggests that we should be skeptical
about the Court's willingness to entertain the idea of this sort of
"reverse accommodation." There the Court held unconstitutional a
ban on religious assemblies at a public university, which the university attempted to justify by citing its concern that allowing the
assemblies would violate the Establishment Clause.5 1 Widmar is
not a true "reverse accommodation" case for two reasons, however.
First, the Court held that the denial violated the free speech rights
of the students who wished to conduct the religious assemblies. 2 A
parallel free speech argument almost certainly is not available to
religious institutions excluded from participation in voucher systems. Second, the claim that allowing the assemblies would violate
the Establishment Clause, or even that allowing them would significantly intrude on the values protected by the Establishment
Clause, is quite weak in the context of prayer meetings to be held
in ordinary university buildings where all sorts of other student'S See the discussions in Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 S Ct
Rev 1, 33-34; Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principleof Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 Georgetown L J 1691 (1988).
'9 Roberts v Madigan, 921 F2d 1047 (10th Cir 1990).
50 454 US 263 (1981).
51 Id at 270-71.
62 Id at 276.
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sponsored activities take place. 53 Still, Widmar suggests that the
Court might not be enthusiastic about a "reverse accommodation"
principle.
To summarize, a state could indeed eliminate its public
schools, either entirely or by adopting an unregulated voucher system, subject only to some limitations in the context of ongoing judicial supervision of desegregation. Current Establishment Clause
doctrine would not bar the government from developing a voucher
system in which some vouchers would be used at religious elementary and secondary schools. In this sense, then, the Constitution
does not distinguish between public and private education.
2. Prohibitingprivate schools.
The next question is whether a state could prohibit private
schools. Here there appears to be a definitive answer. Pierce v Society of Sisters squarely held unconstitutional a state effort to
eliminate private schools.54 Without attempting to undermine the
authority of Pierce entirely, 55 I would note that it arose in a context of nativist hostility to Catholics, and that the police power
6
justification for prohibiting private schools was quite attenuated.
In addition, Pierce relied on the doctrine of substantive due process.57 According to the Court in Bowers v Hardwick,58 "[t]he
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. '59 In consequence, according to the Court, "[t]here should be . . . great resistance to expand the substantive reach" of the due process
clause.6 0
It is difficult to imagine contemporary contexts in which legislatures might actually abolish private schools, and thus it is difficult to assess what the balance would be between the interest protected in Pierce and the goals the government was trying to attain.
58

See also Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v Mergens, 110 S Ct 2356

(1990) (upholding against constitutional challenge the Equal Access Act, 20 USC §§ 407174 (1990)).
268 US 510 (1925).
" The holding has repeatedly been endorsed, most recently in Employment Division,
Dept. of Human Resources v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595, 1601 (1990).
" For a discussion of the background of Pierce, see David Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 Am Hist Rev 74 (1968).
" Pierce, 268 US at 535.
478 US 186 (1986).
B, Id at 194.
*o Id at 194-95.
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Consider, however, the possibility that Congress, acting pursuant
to its power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluded that the availability of private schools interfered with society's ability to reach a point of social integration where judgments
about people's worth are made solely on the basis of individual
merit, and therefore prohibited the operation of private schools."1
That justification is more substantial than the one offered in
Pierce, and it might be sufficient to overcome the weakened protection given substantive due process rights by the Court's analysis
in Bowers.
In short, there is no reason to believe that governments would
try to abolish private schools. Yet, despite Pierce, the doctrinal
materials are available to uphold such an abolition under certain
circumstances. Under those circumstances, the difference between
public and private schools would of course disappear as well.
B.

State Regulation of Private Schools

1. Entry.
Even if states may not completely eliminate private schools,
however, the Constitution may allow them to regulate these
schools so extensively that there is no real point in worrying about
whether they "survive" as distinct entities or not. Before examining regulations of curricula, I think it helpful to examine the con61 1 use an example of congressional legislation, but I believe that states, though they

lack the specific power granted by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, have equivalent
authority as part of their general police powers. The holding to the contrary in City of
Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469 (1989), seems to me completely insupportable. In
our constitutional system, states are governments with general legislative authority while
the national government has only the authority given it through enumerated grants of
power. Except in connection with powers granted to the national government that are
designed to exclude the exercise of power by state governments, the national government
has no greater power than a state government. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not appear to be such an "exclusively national" power. In any event, to the extent that
Croson holds that state authority to eliminate the effects of discrimination is not as broad as
Congress's power under § 5, it does so in the context of a statute that on its face distinguished between African-Americans and other racial groups. Croson, 488 US at 478. The
statute hypothesized here, in contrast, is facially neutral in the relevant sense, though it
may be "race specific." For a discussion of the latter category, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis
M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 575-76 (Little,
Brown & Co., 1986). The Court's treatment of "race specific" statutes has been inconsistent;
sometimes it has subjected them to the strict requirements imposed on facially discriminatory statutes, and sometimes it has subjected them to the less strict requirements imposed
on statutes that are facially neutral. See id at 577-78.
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stitutional constraints on entry to and exit from public and private
schools.
One apparent difference between public and private schools is
that the Constitution bars the former but not the latter from using
invidious entrance criteria. Public schools may not deny entry on
the basis of race"2 or, certainly in higher education and probably in
elementary and secondary education, on the basis of gender,6 and,
presumably, they may not define admissions criteria that demand
acceptance of specified religious tenets." In contrast, private
schools may do all of these things, although there may be some
state action limitations on the tax benefits or other forms of general public assistance that governments can give to such schools.6 5
In light of the strong public policy against invidious discrimination, the fact that public and private schools are treated differently with respect to invidious discrimination may have relatively
few consequences for policy relevant discussions. More interesting,
perhaps, are the cases of schools that adopt admissions criteria or
curricula that have predictable consequences for the racial or gender composition of their student bodies. Consider a state university
system that has a graded set of admissions criteria, with admission
to the system's "flagship" schools determined by highly selective
academic criteria, and open admission to other schools. Suppose
that the use of these different criteria means that the students at
the schools with open admissions are predominantly AfricanAmerican and members of other minority groups. The administrators of these schools decide that the academic quality of their programs would be enhanced by instituting an aggressive ethnic studies program, the effect of which is to retain more of the students
admitted to the schools and, not coincidentally, to increase the attractiveness of these schools relative to the flagship schools for
Brown v Board of Educ., 347 US 483 (1954).
3 As to higher education, see Mississippi Univ. for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718
(1982). Earlier the Court had divided evenly on the constitutionality of maintaining separate secondary schools for men and women, Vorcheimer v School Dist. of Philadelphia,532
F2d 880 (1976), aff'd without opinion, 430 US 703 (1977), but that result is unlikely to
survive Hogan.
0

" See, for example, Everson v Board of Educ., 330 US 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment of religion' clause . . . means neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can
force (a person] to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.").
"' Allen v Wright, 468 US 737 (1984), denied standing to plaintiffs seeking to challenge

what they claimed was an inadequate system of detecting the existence of racial discrimination in private schools; had such discrimination occurred, statutory policy barred granting
the schools tax exempt status. See also Bob Jones Univ. v United States, 461 US 574
(1983).
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members of minority groups. This maintains the racial identifiability of the schools.
The question of the constitutionality of programs such as
these has been litigated only in connection with historically African-American state colleges and universities located in states with
a history of legally mandated segregation. At least so far, the
courts have not been receptive to the claims by the administrators
of these institutions."6 The history of segregation complicates the
constitutional analysis in these cases, because implementing programs such as those I have sketched may, in the courts' eyes, interfere with the process of desegregating flagship institutions, which
were all-white because of segregation statutes rather than because
of differential admissions criteria. Thus the Court's reluctance
might be diminished, as in the case of vouchers, when there is no
process of on-going desegregation. 7
If it were possible to consider the question in other states, I
am not sure what the proper constitutional response would be.
Most of the programs are facially neutral and, under Washington v
Davis, would be unconstitutional only if adopted in order to discriminate. The academic justification for the programs would, I believe, be sufficient to defeat the claim that they were intentionally
discriminatory. If that analysis is correct, it might be constitutionally permissible for states to operate schools that were, in the language of the desegregation cases, racially identifiable.
The preceding argument seems sufficient to defend the most
recent proposals to establish schools with Afro-centric curricula.6 8
Some of these proposals, however, go beyond using a distinctive
curriculum to respond to the perceived academic needs of the students most likely to attend, and would limit attendance to, for ex-

* See Ayers v Allain, 914 F2d 676 (5th Cir 1990), motion granted, cert granted, in part,
United States v Mabus, 113 L Ed 2d 644 (1991); United States v Louisiana, 692 F Supp
642 (E D La 1988), vacated and motion for summary judgment granted, 751 F Supp 606 (E

D La 1990). In Ayers, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that in the context of higher
education, because students chose which colleges to attend, it was sufficient for Equal Protection purposes that the state adopted and implemented admissions policies that were
facially neutral as to race. Ayers, 914 F2d at 692. See also Derrick Bell, Black Colleges and
the Desegregation Dilemma, 28 Emory L J 949 (1979); Felix V. Baxter, The Affirmative
Duty to Desegregate Institutions of HigherEducation: Defining the Role of the Traditionally Black College, 11 J L & Educ 1 (1982).
67 See text accompanying notes 23-38.

" For a description of one such proposal, see Civil Liberties Union Likens MinoritySchool Plan to Segregation, NY Times 1-20 (Jan 13, 1991).
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ample, African-American males. 9 Such admissions requirements
are of course not facially neutral. Their constitutionality depends
on what the mandate of Brown v Board of Educ.0 is taken to be.
The common interpretation of Brown is that it stands for the proposition that, with exceptions not relevant to this discussion, it is
impermissible for governments to allocate benefits or burdens using explicitly racial criteria. Under that interpretation, the limitations on admissions would be unconstitutional.
An alternative interpretation, however, would emphasize that
Brown relied on social scientific data to support the proposition,
apparently important to the Court's reasoning, that segregating
students "solely because of [their] race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 2 Proponents of schools limited to African-American males argue that such
schools are either essential or at least appropriate ways of overcoming feelings of inferiority that persist even after other social
responses to de facto segregation have been tried.7 3 If race-based
admissions criteria are impermissible under Brown only when they
lead to feelings of inferiority, schools with attendance limited to
African-American males might be constitutional, depending on the
degree of deference the courts would give to legislative determinations that separate schools best address feelings of inferiority. And,
if courts accept their findings, the differences between public and
private schools become even less significant in a constitutional
sense.
If public programs -with distinctive curricula or with limited
admissions criteria are justifiable, however, it is ultimately because
the resulting patterns of attendance are not invidious. While the
Constitution permits private schools to use invidious entry criteria,
there are numerous statutory prohibitions on invidious discrimination by private schools. With respect to most private schools, for
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866,' as interpreted in Runyon v
69

For a description of such proposals, see Milwaukee Creating 2 Schools for Black

Boys, NY Times 1-1 (Sept 30, 1990); All Male School Gets Green Light in Detroit, NY

Times A16 (Mar 1, 1991).
70,347 US 483 (1954).
7'
Richard Posner, The De Funis Case and the Constitutionalityof Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 S Ct Rev 1, 25.
7
Brown, 347 US at 494.

78 See, for example, Milwaukee Creating 2 Schools, NY Times at 1-1.
7' 42 USC § 1981 (1988).
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McCrary,7 " bars racial discrimination in private schools' admissions. Would broader prohibitions on discrimination on the basis
76
of gender or religious belief be constitutional?
Discriminatory private schools might object to such regulation
on the ground that it violates their constitutional rights of association or, where the discrimination is based on political or religious
views, their other rights under the First Amendment. In Runyon
the Court rejected a claim based on the right of association, on the
ground that discriminatory practices receive no protection under
the Constitution.7 The Court has also said that state and local legislation banning discrimination by private clubs does not violate
the associational rights of members of those clubs where the clubs
were relatively large. 8 Finally, Bob Jones Univ. v United States
held that the University's religious rights were not violated when
the government chose not to allow it tax exempt status because it
discriminated on the basis of race. 79 These cases rather strongly
suggest that substantial regulatory restrictions might be placed on
discriminatory private schools, and that in many instances discrimination probably can be prohibited outright."0

78 427 US 160 (1976).
70 Here I do not intend to distinguish between a state government's general police
power authority to ban discrimination and the perhaps more limited power of the national
government to act with respect to categories other than race. As to the latter, see EEOC v
Wyoming, 460 US 226, 260 (1983) (Burger dissenting) (arguing that Congress lacks power to
enforce Fourteenth Amendment except where discrimination would, or perhaps might, itself
violate the Constitution).
7 Runyon, 427 US at 175-76 (citing Norwood v Harrison, 413 US 455 (1973)).

7' The most recent case in this line is New York State Club Ass'n v City of New York,
487 US 1 (1987), upholding a ban on discrimination by clubs with more than 400 members
and which provide regular meal service and receive substantial funds from nonmembers for
services. See also Michael Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Men's Clubs:
The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 Harv CR-CL L Rev 321 (1983),
though written before the Supreme Court dealt with these issues, provides a comprehensive
analysis that fully comports with what the Court has since done.
79 461 US 574 (1983).
80See also Comment, 41 Stan L Rev at 1228 (cited in note 4), arguing that Georgetown
University "was not acting as a religious community turned inward" because it admitted
students regardless of religious affiliation, did not require attendance at chapel, and had a
basically secular educational mission. To the extent that small schools, organized essentially
by word of mouth, might be able to claim rights of association even after Runyon and the
club cases, it seems likely that government requirements that schools provide a specified
range of curricular choices would be sufficient to make it uneconomic to operate such
schools. For a discussion of the curricular requirements, see text accompanying notes 11629.
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2. Exit.
Analogous conclusions can be drawn about regulation of exit
from schools. The Due Process Clause imposes limits on the methods government can use to expel or suspend students from public
schools.8 1 Private schools, however, are limited, in the absence of
legislation, only by the contracts they make with their students
(and, where relevant, the parents of those students). Yet, it seems
to me unquestionable that a state could use its general police
power to require that private schools use the same procedures that
the public schools do in expelling students.2
In short, the difference between what governments must do
with respect to public schools and what they may do with respect
to private schools is narrower than the sharp legal distinction between public and private schools suggests. To the extent that there
are real differences in the actual degree of regulation of public and
private schools, those differences result from choices made by governments not to exercise power that they could use in a constitutionally permissible manner to make private schools resemble public schools, or to make public schools resemble private schools,
83
more substantially.
C.

State Regulation of Curricula

The basic questions with respect to the curricula of public and
private schools are: Does the Constitution require public schools to
have any particular course offerings? Does it prohibit them from
having certain offerings?8 4 Does it permit governments to require
private schools to offer certain courses? Does it permit governments to prohibit private schools from offering other courses?s
See, for example, Goss v Lopez, 419 US 565 (1975). The questions raised by limitations on the substantive grounds on which public schools can expel students, and the imposition of similar limitations by statute on private schools, are the same questions about associational, political, and religious rights that I have already discussed in connection with
entry restrictions. See text accompanying notes 76-79.
" Here, rather than earlier, it seems particularly appropriate to note that doing so

might not be good public policy. My concern in this Article, however, is not with what good
policy is, but with what the Constitution requires and permits.
B8 For a similar conclusion, though stated as a suggestion for revision
of existing law
rather than as account of that law, see J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99 Yale L J 251, 299-300 n 184 (1989) ("I would be . . .
inclined to treat reasonably autonomous state universities as private parties, freeing universities more broadly from strictures designed for governmental entities").
Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 Mich L

Rev 1373, 1426-47 (1976).
SI Occasionally one sees claims that teachers in public schools may have independent
constitutional rights to refrain from teaching courses to which they have religious or politi-
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1. Public schools.
No cases hold, and there appears to be no justification for
holding, that the Constitution requires public schools to offer any
particular course. Epperson v Arkansas, however, stands for the
proposition that, once a public school decides to offer a course, it
may be required to include a particular version of the subject matter." Epperson invalidated a statute barring the teaching of the
biological theory of human evolution. 7 According to the Court, the
statute violated the Establishment Clause because it excluded
from the range of permissible approaches to the subject of biology
it is
only one approach, and did so "for the sole reason 8 that
8
doctrine.
religious
particular
a
with
conflict
deemed to
Even in the modest form in which the Court stated the principle, the implications of this analysis are puzzling. It would be difficult to contend that a school is required to offer a biology course at
all. Yet suppose that the school board decides not to offer the
course solely because, under Epperson, if offered the course would
have to include instruction regarding the theory of evolution. Or,
suppose that the board decides not to offer the course because, all
things considered, doing so would engender too much controversy. 9 Even relatively narrow readings of Epperson suggest that
such a board action would be unconstitutional.9 0 If so, the government is indeed required to include subjects in the curriculum, if
the sole reason for excluding the subjects would be their conflict
with the teachings of a particular religion. I assume, however, that
the "sole reason" criterion would rarely be satisfied, even if it encompasses reasons going to the avoidance of controversy. Ordinarily, public schools will be able to offer reasons based on judgments about the most effective way to use limited resources to
justify excluding some subjects from the curriculum.
cal objections, or that teachers in private schools have a constitutional privilege not to teach

courses that the government may nonetheless require the schools to offer. Most often these
claims are derivative of other constitutional claims: for example, that the public school is
constitutionally barred from offering the objectionable course at all, even if taught by a
willing teacher, or that the private school itself has an immunity from offering the course.
For a discussion of the independent claims of teachers, see text accompanying notes 105-10.
86 393 US 97 (1968).

Id.
Id at 103.
81 Justice Black, concurring in Epperson, suggested that the statute there might have
87
8

been adopted to ensure that "this controversial subject" would not be part of the curriculum. Id at 112-13.
80

But see Epperson, 393 US at 109, where the Court suggests that Arkansas could have

excised all discussion of human origins from its curricula without violating the Establishment Clause.
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The obverse of Epperson was presented in Edwards v Aguillard, 1 the creationism case, where the Court was asked to decide
what the government is prohibited from offering in its schools. One
commonly accepted principle underlying the First Amendment is
that the Establishment Clause bars governments from offering instruction in religion, though they may offer instruction about religion. Invoking this principle, the Court in Aguillard invalidated
Louisiana's requirement that, whenever the theory of evolution
was taught, the school had to provide balanced treatment of the
theory of scientific creationism as well.92 The Court's articulated
reason was that the state's primary purpose for adopting the requirement, as revealed in the legislative history and the Court's
perusal of the issues surrounding the debate about evolution and
creationism, was to promote a religious view on the origin of
human life. 3 This position is intelligible only on the supposition,
rejected by Justice Scalia's dissent,9"' that "creation science" was a
misleading label for what was essentially a religious view. To the
extent that the Court believed that it had the capacity to determine that a purportedly scientific theory was in fact a religious
one, the decision in Aguillard must rest on the Court's determination that governments are barred from presenting as "truth" matters that are not "truths"-whether because they are false or because they are neither true nor false.
The Establishment Clause singles out one subject matter, religion, that governments are barred from advocating. The distinction between "truths" and "other than truths" on which Aguillard
seems to rest casts some light on the question of whether there are
other subjects, or approaches to subjects, that the government may
not teach. The question can be posed in its starkest form by asking
whether it is constitutionally permissible for a school board to insist that courses in government provide instruction supporting the
platform of the board's preferred political party. I suspect that the
immediate intuition of most readers is that such a curricular requirement would be unconstitutional, but I hope to show that the
question is more difficult than it initially appears.
Consider first a program of instruction in civics the primary
goal of which is to communicate the message that, for all its flaws,
the political system of the United States is substantially better
9- 482 US 578 (1987).
92

Id.

Id at 591-94.
" Id at 611-12.
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than almost every other political system in the world. If that program is unconstitutional, nearly every civics course in the elementary and secondary schools of the United States is unconstitutional. To generalize, it would seem that simply taking sides on
controvertible questions of political theory does not violate the
Constitution even though taking sides on controvertible questions
of religion does.
Next consider a statute requiring that courses in economics
show that a market-based economy along the lines of this country
or Western Europe is superior, both in terms of efficiency and distribution, to command economies-or, more bluntly, that the
courses demonstrate the evils of communism. 5 Again, I doubt that
such a statute is unconstitutional. One reason might be that, like
the theory of evolution, the economic theory prescribed by the
statute simply is correct. Yet, in the evolution cases the Court was
careful to refrain from suggesting that what was wrong. with
prohibiting the teaching of evolution or with requiring that creation science be taught was that the theory of evolution is correct
and creation science is wrong. Alternatively, the statute might be
constitutional because, again, nothing in the Constitution limits
governments from taking positions on matters of political theory.
Finally, consider the fact that political figures routinely use
public funds to advocate the partisan programs they were elected
to advance.9 6 Here too the government "takes sides" on controversial political issues without facing constitutional limitations.
In all of these areas, there appear to be no constitutional limitations on the power of government to advance a particular political program in its schools. The civics and economics examples
might be limited by the suggestion that, at least in this country,
the consensus on the correctness of the views asserted is so broad
as to validate the programs; with such a limitation, perhaps a government might not be authorized to advocate positions as to which
there was less consensus. The fact that speech of political figures
" The American Bar Association had a committee that urged the adoption of such programs of instruction. See American Bar Association-Special Committee on Education in
the Contrast between Liberty under Law and Communism, Instructionon Communism and
Its Contrast with Liberty Under Law (American Bar Association, 1962) (chaired by Lewis

F. Powell, Jr.). This pamphlet reports that Florida and Louisiana adopted statutes requiring
education on the subject. Id at 8. The Special Committee became a Standing Committee on
Education Against Communism in 1962, and sponsored conferences that produced a suggested syllabus, published as Democracy Confronts Communism in World Affairs (ABA,
1965).
M For a general discussion, see Mark Yudof, When Government Speaks (UC Berkeley,

1983).
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appears to be free of constitutional constraint, however, suggests
that this limitation, while perhaps attractive as a policy matter, is
97
not compelled by the Constitution.
What, then, of the program of instruction in the truth of the
tenets of a political party? In elementary and secondary schools,
and in some courses in higher education, e" such a program might
infringe on the constitutional rights of a captive audience. For example, people generally have an interest in avoiding undesired
communications such as junk mail. The "captive audience" idea, in
its usual forms, authorizes the government to protect that interest
by, for example, providing some mechanism by which people can
tell the government not to transmit junk mail to them. 99 The government moves against a speaker and justifies its action as protecting the interests of the captive audience. 10 0 The "captive audience" doctrine, that is, deals with the existence of governmental
authority, not, as it would act in the present context, as a source of
limitation on government power.' 0
Moving from the idea of a protectible interest in avoiding undesired communication to a doctrine that would elevate that interest to the status of a constitutional right seems quite difficult.
Outside the schools, of course, there are few situations in which
people are truly captive audiences for government communications. 10 2 Yet, I doubt whether the courts would seriously entertain
an objection to public service messages or poems placed by the
government on its buses.' The case coming closest to recognizing
a right to be free of undesired communications is. Wooley v May-

.

I stress that in speaking of the speech of political figures I am referring to speech not

in their personal or merely political capacity, which might be protected by the First Amendment, but speech in their official capacity, as indicated by the fact that they use public
funds in support of their actions.
"8Iam referring here to those that are formally or as a practical matter required.
See, for example, Rowan v Post Office Dept., 397 US 728 (1970).

'00 See Stone, et al, ConstitutionalLaw at 1152-53 (cited in note 61).

101 No helpful analogy can be drawn from the occasional suggestion in discussions of
school prayer that such prayers should be barred because public school students are like a
captive audience. See, for example, Abington School Dist. v Schempp, 374 US 203, 318-19
(1963) (Stewart dissenting). The Free Exercise Clause implies that the government may not
impose its views about religion on a captive .audience, whereas there is no analogous principle of free expression generally.

'02 I put aside "special environments" such as the military and prisons, which have
become the subject of special constitutional rules. See, generally, Stone, et al, Constitutional

Law at 1267-73.
103

Nor do I think that what underlies that response is the thought that bus riders are

not truly a captive audience because they could use some other form of transportation. See
Public Utilities Commission v Pollak, 343 US 451 (1952).
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nard, which invalidated a New Hampshire statute requiring drivers to display the state slogan on their license plates.104 The Court
treated the statute as one forcing people to distribute the state's
message and not, as the argument being considered would demand,
as a statute forcing the government's message on an unwilling listener. In short, governments engage in too many activities, the
constitutionality of which seems unquestionable, that could be
characterized as intruding on the interest of some captive audience
for such a doctrine limiting the government's power to communicate in these situations to be practicable.
Another source of constitutional objection to a prescribed curriculum is the teacher who is required to provide the instruction.
Suppose that a school board defines the curriculum of its family
life course to include instruction in the availability of abortion, and
the regular teacher of that course has a religiously grounded objection to presenting that material. Or suppose that an economics
teacher has a politically grounded objection to presenting material
on the role of advertising in a market economy in the manner prescribed by the school board. Must the board relieve the teachers of
the obligation to follow the prescribed curriculum?'0 5 Both exam104430 US 705 (1977).
'6 For discussions of the freedom of teachers, each reaching contradictory conclusions,

see Stephen Goldstein, The Asserted Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What
They Teach, 124 U Pa L Rev 1293 (1976); William Van Alstyne, The ConstitutionalRights
of Teachers and Professors, 1970 Duke L J 841. Van Alstyne argues that a school board
violates the Constitution when it "so rigidly determines the exact and preselected details of
each course that in fact it employs the teacher as a mere mechanical instrument of its impermissible design." Van Alstyne, 1970 Duke L J at 856. The design is impermissible because it involves "arbitrary restrictions on alternative sources of information or opinion,
resulting not from understandable budgetary constraints or the restraint upon the time
available for study." Id at 857. I confess that, as I read Van Alstyne's argument, all the
analytic work is done by the characterizations "impermissible" and "arbitrary," and that
the accuracy of those characterizations is precisely what is at issue. Van Alstyne's other
argument appears to be that it is impermissible for a teacher to use the classroom to indoctrinate students in his or her views, and that, by some sort of symmetry, it ought to be
equally impermissible for the school board to use the classroom for such purposes. Id at 856.
The board's indoctrination, however, has a source in a prior decision by the electorate that
is entirely absent in the case of teachers' indoctrination. In our constitutional system, decisions made through the regular processes of election have a degree of justification that is
absent from decisions made by professionals exercising professional judgment. That seems
to me sufficient to defeat any argument based on symmetry. It could be, of course, that for
some reason the validation given by professional judgment has equivalent status to the validation given by democratic processes, but, though I have read such arguments, I confess
that I have not yet found one to be persuasive.
The Free Exercise and Free Speech rights of teachers in this context are, I believe,
essentially identical, because the "exercise" that the religious objector wishes to engage in is
the unimpaired holding of a set of beliefs. Although the Free Exercise Clause may protect
some aspects of religious exercise that are not protected by the Free Speech Clause, the
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pies involve government efforts to require people to affiliate themselves with views to which they object. Ordinarily, as Wooley v
Maynard shows, when governments attempt to impose such duties
to "speak" on the general population, serious constitutional questions arise. Wooley is limited to some extent by the holding in
PruneYard Shopping Center v Robins, in which the Court found
no constitutional violation in a rule of state law requiring the
owner of a shopping center to make its property available for political communication. 10 6 However, the Court in PruneYard empha10 7
sized "a number of distinguishing factors" compared to Wooley.
The government did not prescribe the message, and the setting
was such that it would be quite unusual for observers to impute
the views expressed in the political activities to the owner of the
shopping mall. The school curriculum, in contrast, resembles
Wooley more than PruneYard: The school board does prescribe
the message, and the school setting makes it quite difficult as a
practical matter for the teacher to disclaim association with the
message.
Does it make a difference that, in the curriculum case, the obligation to speak is imposed only on government employees and
not on the general public? On one view, the Court's patronage
cases suggest that it does not. The patronage cases hold that the
government may not require its employees to affiliate themselves
with particular political parties in order to obtain or retain their
10 8
jobs.
Yet, in a cognate context, the Court has suggested that it does
make a difference that the obligation is imposed only on government employees. Until recently, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to require that government
accommodate the religious beliefs of those affected by its general

interest in not being compelled to say things with which one disagrees does not seem to be
one of them. That interest is as equally impaired when the source of the disagreement is
political as it is when the source is religious. Note, for example, that the Court in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943), used the Free Speech Clause to
protect the interests of religious objectors in refraining from compelled expression. Id at
642. In sum, nothing in the Supreme Court's cases suggests that religious beliefs as such are
more protected than political beliefs. See also William Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 Minn L Rev 545 (1983).
1" 447 US 74 (1980).

Id at 87.
I" See, for example, Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S Ct 2729 (1990).
107

66

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1991:

legislationl0e However, the Court developed an exception to this
doctrine. It held that individuals with religious objections to legislation may not "require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."' 110 Those cases involved objections to the manner in
which the government maintained its records and to the government's disposition of its property, and the Court did not carefully
spell out the precise contours of the "internal affairs" exception.
Nonetheless, at least intuitively it seems to me that the definition
of a curriculum is more like an "internal affair" than is the imposition of a regulation on the general population. The patronage cases
may be said not to involve "internal affairs" in the same sense,
because the obligation to affiliate with a political party has 'no
bearing, as the Court saw it, on the employee's performance of her
job duties but related only to the general political program of the
party.
On one level the conclusions I have reached seem problematic.
Put in its strongest form, the constitutional doctrine I have identified appears to allow a government to insist that an unwilling
teacher indoctrinate his or her students on matters that are highly
controversial and partisan."' I suspect that most readers will
'09 Compare Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963), with Employment Division v
Smith, 110 S Ct 1595 (1990). The latter case is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 122-129.
"OBowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 699 (1986) (opinion of Burger). See also Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 US 439 (1988).
.. The constitutional limitations on a public school's ability to limit the non-curriculum related speech of teachers and students deserves a brief note. Under Tinker v Des
Moines School Dist., 393 US 503 (1969), students may engage in political speech in school if
that activity does not interfere with the pedagogical operations of the school. Tinker was
limited in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v Fraser,478 US 675 (1986), where the Court allowed
the school to impose disciplinary sanctions on a student who, during a campaign for class
office, made sexually suggestive, though non-obscene, remarks. One distinction the Court
drew between the two cases was that Fraser's speech did not refer to "politics" in the same
sense that it was used in Tinker; in particular, with reference to political activity outside the
school. Id at 680. Another distinction was that the campaign for class office meant that
Fraser's statements were in a meaningful sense associated with statements "by" the school,
which could not act to disassociate itself from those remarks, unlike the school in Tinker. Id
at 685-86. The latter distinction was also important in Hazelwood School Dist. v Kuhlmeier,
484 US 260 (1988), in which the Court allowed a school to censor stories in a newspaper
produced in conjunction with a journalism course. (The newspaper was also curriculumrelated in the sense I have used, and perhaps the campaign for class office in Fraserwas as
well. If those activities are considered to be part of the school's curriculum itself, the substantial power of the government to determine a school's curriculum, both by including material and by excluding it, would'justify the restrictions at issue in these cases). Finally, in
Pickering v Board of Educ., 391 US 563 (1968), the Court prohibited a school board from
firing teachers who criticized education policy in public. That is different, however, from

CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCE
think, at least initially, that there is something wrong with such a
doctrine. Other considerations, however, may reduce if not dispel
entirely such concerns.
Most suggestive, perhaps, is that school boards and university
governing authorities rarely behave in the way I have said they
could. The reason is that they are subject to political control, either directly by the electorate or indirectly by state legislatures.
Precisely because indoctrination in partisan positions is politically
controversial, the political constraints on school boards make it unlikely that they will adopt as extreme a position as I have described.1" 2 As Dean Yudof has argued, the reason that the constitutional limitations on speech by the government are so loose is that
the political limitations on such speech are stringent enough to
prevent the government from engaging in the most troubling sorts
of indoctrination."I3 Similarly, to the extent that the Court has
abandoned the requirement that government accommodate the religious views of those it regulates, it did so with the understanding
that objectors could and often would use the political process to
4
obtain an exemption from this regulation."
To say that the political process constrains school boards and
other policy-makers is not to say, of course, that it guarantees that
the resulting policy will be identical to the policy that a disinterested judge might devise, nor is it to deny that there will be jurisdictions in which troubling results will obtain. To an important extent, though, the question for constitutional law deals with
comparative judgments about institutions."' I concede that school
boards and the like will occasionally adopt policies that are incon-

refusing to teach the prescribed curriculum, and the balancing test adopted in Pickering
would almost certainly allow a school board to fire a teacher whose criticism of the pre-

scribed curriculum, or of general education policies, extended to the classroom as well as to
the newspapers. Pickering itself might be limited by Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983)

(allowing dismissal of assistant district attorney who circulated questionnaire within office
critical of district attorney's policies). In each of these situations private schools could expel
students or fire teachers, absent legislative restriction. Yet, there seems to be little question,

independent of the regulation of curricula matters discussed in the text, that legislatures
could impose on private schools the same restrictions that the Constitution imposes on pub-

lic schools.
,' For a similar conclusion as to elementary and secondary education, see Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 Harv L Rev 1045, 1054 (1968) ("limitations on

parochialism in the local schools should ordinarily be imposed by the people of the state
acting through the legislature").
,' Yudof, When Government Speaks at 91-92 (cited in note 96).
,14 Employment Division v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595, 1606 (1990).
,1 See Neil Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for

ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U Chi L Rev 366 (1984).
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sistent with constitutional values, and that supervision by the electorate or by state legislatures will not catch all those policies. Still,
that addresses only half of the issue. We must also consider
whether courts will be able to identify the troubling instances
where the political process has failed, while simultaneously allowing political actors to make permissible choices within the
range that the Constitution leaves open to them. The judicial process, like the political one, is not perfect, and we can be sure that
the courts will make a number of errors: They will fail to invalidate
some practices in which constitutional values are in fact infringed,
and they will invalidate others when in fact the political process
selected a constitutionally permissible policy.
Making the proper comparative judgment is generally quite
difficult, and the difficulty is compounded in the present context.
Curricula deal with questions about which there may be general
agreement as to the right answer, and with matters about which
there remains disagreement. There are lines between exposure to
competing views, indoctrination in a partisan viewpoint, and instruction in what is generally accepted as essentially uncontrovertible. I think it unlikely that the courts would systematically do
better than the political process at drawing the lines. Thus, the
relatively simple-minded reading of the cases, which yields the
conclusion that there are few limits on how governments can define
the curricula of public schools, is in my view supported by a more
elaborate understanding of the role of the courts and politics in the
constitutional system.
2. Private schools.
The preceding analysis provides the basis for considering the
extent to which the Constitution limits the power of government to
prescribe the curricula at private schools. Here too the question
has two parts: May the government prohibit a private school from
offering a particular course? May it require private schools to offer
particular courses?
Meyer v Nebraska held that the state could not prohibit private schools from offering instruction in foreign languages before
the eighth grade.116 That would seem to dispose of the possibility
that, for example, a state legislature could bar private schools from
teaching creation science. Because, in some instances, public
I'd 262 US 390 (1923).
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schools cannot teach creation science, this is a place where there is

a clear difference between public and private schools. "'
State-prescribed courses raise more complex questions. All
states enforce their compulsory attendance laws by finding that at-

tendance at private schools will not count as compliance with the
laws unless the schools comply with certain minimum standards;
these standards often require that the schools' teachers be certified, and that some specified subjects be offered in the schools. The
subjects typically are English, mathematics, and the like, and the
standards ordinarily do not prescribe the precise content of the
programs of instruction. These requirements have occasionally

been challenged by church-related schools, which contend that the
First Amendment prohibits the state from imposing the requirements. State courts have regularly rejected these challenges, find-

ing that the burden that complying with the regulations places on
religious belief is outweighed by the public interest in assuring that
children receive an adequate education." 8 The courts, however,
also routinely note that the church-related schools do not hold it
as a tenet of their religion that teachers not receive state certifica-

tion or that instruction in the specified subjects not be offered."'
I think it worth noting that it would be quite difficult to devise an effective prohibition. Facing a prohibition, a private school could reorganize itself into a school and a parent
cooperative, require that everyone who signs a contract with the school for instruction also
become a member of the parent cooperative, and define the school's operating hours so that
every child is taught creation science or German by the parent cooperative outside school
hours. Were the state to attempt to prohibit this sort of device, it would be limiting the
liberty of parents to "direct the upbringing and education of [their] children," Pierce v
Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534-35 (1925), a limitation that might be constitutionally
questionable without regard to questions about private schools. The resolution of that constitutional question would draw on cases dealing with the regulation of home schooling. See
Neal Devins, A ConstitutionalRight to Home Instruction?, 62 Wash U L Q 435 (1984).
Typically, home education is approved "subject to a process of official approval on matters
of curriculum, teacher competence, textbook adequacy, and pupil progress." Ira Lupu,
Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separationof Powers, 67 BU L Rev 971, 972
(1987) (summarizing holding 'of Care and Protectionof Charles, 399 Mass 324, 504 NE2d
592 (1987)). See also James Tobak and Perry Zirkel, Home Instruction: An Analysis of the
Statutes and Case Law, 8 U Dayton L Rev 1 (1982); Comment, Parental Rights: Educational Alternatives and Curriculum Control, 36 Wash & Lee L Rev 277 (1979). In Duro v
District Attorney, 712 F2d 96 (4th Cir 1983), the court found no constitutional violation in
an absolute prohibition on home schooling.
' Compare State v Whisner, 47 Ohio St 2d 181, 351 NE2d 750 (1976) (finding it unconstitutional under Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205 (1972) to require religiously-affiliated
private school to comply with curricular requirements), with State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883
(ND 1980) (finding no constitutional violation in teacher certification requirement to which
school objected on religious grounds).
11 See Comment, The State and Sectarian Education: Regulation to Deregulation,
1980 Duke L J 801, 807-08. But see id at 806 (citing Brief for Defendants, State v Columbus
ChristianAcademy, No. 78 CVS 1678 (Wake Co Superior Ct, NC, Sept 1, 1978)).
11
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Suppose that a state required a school to offer a course to
which the school had a religious objection; it might require that
private schools offer a biology course, or that evolution be taught
in every biology course offered by private schools. Would it violate
the free exercise rights of parents or the schools to impose such a
requirement? Wisconsin v Yoder suggests that it would. 120 Yoder
held that the Free Exercise Clause required states to exempt from
the operation of their compulsory attendance laws students whose
parents had a religious objection to attendance where the children
had already received what the Court characterized as sufficient education to allow them "to participate effectively and intelligently
in our open political system [and] to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in our society." 12 '
It seems unlikely that exempting schools with religious objections from compliance with any particular curricular requirement
would impair the state interest in assuring that students receive
that amount of education. In contrast, exempting certain schools
from the certification requirements completely would impair that
interest, at least when it might be administratively difficult to ensure that students taught by uncertified teachers, or students who
did not receive instruction in specified subjects, actually did obtain
the desired amount of education.
This analysis calls for balancing the burden a law places on
religious exercise against the impairment of some state interest occasioned by exempting religious objectors from the burdensome
law.' 22 Employment Division v Smith, the peyote case, casts some
doubt on the viability of the balancing approach, even though it
specifically reaffirmed the holding in Yoder."'
In Smith the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
require states to provide an exemption based on religious belief
from criminal laws directed at conduct that as a general matter the
state believes to be undesirable. Where such laws were involved,
the Constitution did not require that the state interests be balanced against the burden on religious belief.
10

406 US 205.

2' Id at 221.
"' Formally, the Court would ask whether the burden on the exercise of religion was

justified by a compelling state interest. Although this test does not use the term "balance,"
the Court's determination of the amount of burden, how compelling the state interest is,
and whether the state interest justifies the burden amounts to balancing the interests. For a
demonstration, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96
Yale L J 943 (1987).
I" See Smith, 110 S Ct 1595, 1601 (1990).
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The Court reaffirmed Yoder, however, and in doing so indicated two grounds on which the cases could be distinguished. With
respect to both grounds, the Court indicated that balancing is appropriate only if certain threshold conditions are met: The individual interest must exceed some "floor" before balancing will even be
contemplated, and if the state interest is above some "ceiling," balancing will not be allowed.
The first ground for distinguishing Smith from other cases
deals with the ceiling. In Smith the state expressed its disapproval
of the conduct through its criminal law. Where the state embodies
its judgment in a purely civil law, such as the regulation of private
schools I have hypothesized, its own claim of interest may be
weakened sufficiently to allow the courts to engage in the balancing
process. This distinction seems to me quite untenable. At first
glance it might seem sensible to believe that a state interest asserted in a criminal statute is more substantial than one asserted
in a civil statute, but that belief cannot be sustained on close inspection; some civil statutes exceed the ceiling, and some criminal
ones do not. For example, a state may have a strong policy against
discrimination in employment based on race or sexual preference,
but its legislature may reasonably have concluded that embodying
that policy in a criminal prohibition would actually be less effective, because it would heighten tensions, than embodying it in a
purely civil statute. And, in the other direction, it may be worth
pointing out that the prohibition in Yoder was expressed in a criminal statute, albeit one for the violation of which the defendant was
fined only $5. To the extent that the criminal/civil distinction is
used as a method of triggering the balancing process, it does not
appear to operate in an intuitively appealing way.
The second ground involves the floor of individual interest. In
Yoder the free exercise claim was combined with a claim predicated on the parents' constitutional right "to direct the education
of their children,"1'24 a right also asserted in the hypothetical I am

discussing. When there is such a combination of claims, once again
the courts might properly engage in balancing the interests.
This distinction also seems problematic. According to its reasoning, there may be some circumstances in which a claim based
on the Free Exercise Clause standing alone would not trigger the
balancing process, but a Free Exercise claim joined with another
claim would. It is important to understand that this model makes
1"

Id.
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sense only on the assumption that the second claim standing alone
would also not trigger the balancing process, for otherwise it is the
second claim alone, and without any contribution from the Free
Exercise claim, that does the work. For example, suppose that the
parents' right to direct their children's education is strong enough
itself to require balancing. It then would not matter whether a parent's objection to instruction in biology or evolution was grounded
in religious belief or sheer ignorance; in either case the court would
be authorized to balance the state interest against the impairment
of the parent's interest. 2 5
The idea underlying this second distinction, then, must be
that there are "interests" related to values protected by the Constitution which are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, and that sometimes these interests can be added together
to yield the equivalent of a constitutional right. I think it fair to
say that this is not the usual way in which lawyers think about
constitutional rights. In addition, the additive model of interests
resembles one interpretation of Justice Marshall's approach to
Equal Protection analysis. Under that interpretation, there are interests not amounting to constitutional rights-such as an interest
in education, in voting, and others-which trigger a process of balancing competing interests when they occur in combination. 2 ' The
Court, however, rejected this approach to the Equal Protection
clause, at least in part because of its skepticism about its ability to
identify and then add up nonconstitutional interests.'27 If that
skepticism is justified in the Equal Protection context, it would
seem to be equally justified in the Free Exercise context. If so, the
second ground for distinguishing Yoder from Smith, the former
being a case involving additive interests and the latter being a case
involving only a single interest, disappears.
More fundamental than these difficulties, though, is the primary reason the Court gave for rejecting the balancing process in
'1 Recall that the analysis in Smith is that the Court will not engage in balancing
unless the threshold is crossed. Once the Court finds that balancing is permissible because
the threshold is crossed, presumably an interest grounded in religious belief will have more
weight than one grounded in ignorance.
"I See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall dissenting). On this interpretation of Justice Marshall's approach, the Equal Protection Clause requires a two-step analysis: first, determine the importance of the affected interests when they are cumulated; second, apply an appropriate level of scrutiny to the fit
between the classification used and the government's goals. On an alternative interpretation
of Marshall's approach, the analysis is one-step: balance the interests adversely affected by
the classification against the governmental interests.
12 Id at 33.
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Smith. The Court concluded its substantive analysis with a parade
of horribles, the point of which was to demonstrate that the balancing process was too open-ended for courts to employ. This was
particularly so, the Court said, because any coherent process of determining whether a compelling state interest justified the imposition of burdens on the exercise of religion would have to take into
account the centrality of the belief that was burdened, which was,
according to the Court, a task beyond the capacity, and perhaps
beyond the constitutional authority, of the courts. 12 8
In terms I have already introduced, the critique of balancing
identifies one important source of possible failures in the judicial
process. When coupled with attention to the operation of the political process, the Smith critique of balancing rather strongly suggests that there ought to be few constitutional restrictions on the
ability of legislatures to prescribe curricula for private schools. I
have used an example, requiring that evolution be taught, where
the centrality of the belief seems apparent.' 29 As a practical or policy-relevant matter, however, legislatures are unlikely to impose
such curricular requirements; the religious pluralism of the nation,
and indeed of essentially all the states, joined with a widespread
public commitment to religious toleration, means that legislatures
will rarely if ever require that a private school teach subjects inconsistent with the beliefs of a substantial minority of the population. And, should such a school object to teaching, for example,
social studies because it embodies the philosophy of secular humanism, it seems quite likely that legislatures and courts both
would find the claim sufficiently far-fetched that they would regard
the belief that social studies is inconsistent with religious tenets as
"not central" and outweighed by the interests the state was seeking to promote.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that constitutional doctrine, taken in relatively
straightforward ways, does not support a strong distinction between public and private schools. To the extent that regulation of
110 Employment Division v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595, 1605-06, especially n 4 & 5 (1990).

1, See text accompanying notes 120-21. I noted, however, that it would be relatively

easy to argue that adoption of beliefs inconsistent with the theory of evolution is derivative
of a more fundamental or more central understanding of the proper relation between the
deity and humans. This would contrast with rituals, such as the use of peyote or wine in a
religious sacrament, that are not derivative but constitutive of the exercise of the religious
belief system. This contrast illustrates why it would be improper for courts to investigate
the centrality of particular beliefs in a religion.
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one differs from that of the other, the reason is that legislatures
have chosen not to exercise the power they have. There may be
constitutional limits on what legislatures can prescribe or prohibit
with respect to private schools, as there are on what they can do
with respect to public schools, but these limits are sufficiently loose
that contemporary policy issues dealing with public and private
schools ought to be discussed without regard to the Constitution.
The policy issues are just that, policy issues, and public deliberation about their wisdom or folly ought to proceed unpolluted by
concern that some policy choices would be unconstitutional.

